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ETHICS IN THE LEGAL INDUSTRY
MICHAEL ARIENSt
I. INTRODUCTION
A brief item in the Hearsay section of the June 2017 ABA Journal
was headlined "2%." This number indicated an increase in the per-
centage of lawyers, from 2012 to 2016, "who worked remotely within
the legal industry."1 Making one's "office" a location other than the
physical space leased or owned by oneself or by an employer is hardly
news, even as applied to the work of lawyers. Lawyers know as well
as anyone that technology allows one to work almost anywhere and,
unfortunately, almost any time. What is striking in this brief news
item is the use by the flagship magazine of the American Bar Associa-
tion ("ABA") of the phrase "legal industry."
Characterizing the work of lawyers as part of an industry is rela-
tively new, particularly in legal publications. No definition of "legal
industry" is found in the tenth edition of Black's Law Dictionary, pub-
lished in 2014, nor is one found in the latest (2012) edition of the Bou-
vier Law Dictionary.2 Only one published case, issued in 2012, has
used "legal industry" as a synonym for legal practice or legal profes-
sion. That decision was written by the New York Supreme Court, a
state trial court, on the issue of a claim of fraud in the published em-
ployment data of the defendant law school's graduates.3 Outside of a
1976 law review article,4 references in law reviews to the work of law-
yers as part of an "industry" rather than a profession, a service, or a
practice are rare before the turn of the millennium.
The phrase "legal industry" was used in bar journals and law
management and practice publications during the 1990s in two re-
lated ways: first, it was used as a catchphrase to discuss a particular
f Professor of Law, St. Mary's University.
1. Hearsay, ABA J., June 2017, at 15.
2. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (2012).
3. Gomez-Jimenez v. New York Law School, 943 N.Y.S.2d 834, 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2012). "[It is this court's fervent hope that all the heat generated around this issue over
this last year will be replaced with a renewed sense of responsibility to prospective ap-
plicants and students, starting at the law school level, and extending to the entire legal
industry[.]" Id. The only other use in court opinions is the unpublished opinion in Jin
Soo Lee v. Guyoungtech United States Inc., No. 16-0334-KD-B, 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis
68526, at *16-17 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 17, 2017) (assessing whether party's claim of attorney
fees was "reasonable considering ... the legal industry in general").
4. Nancy K. Olmsted, Law as a Business: The Impact of Title VII on the Legal
"Industry", 10 VAL. U. L. REv. 479 (1976). The quotation marks may explain the au-
thor's cognizance of its unusual use.
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subset of consumers of computer equipment and related products and
services.5 Its second use was by those engaged in law firm manage-
ment and staffing, as shorthand when discussing the business of oper-
ating a private law practice.
6
Referring to the work of lawyers, especially private practice law-
yers, as part of a "legal industry," became more prevalent upon the
turn of the millennium. The magic of the year 2000 offered lawyers
(and others) the opportunity to speculate about the future, usually in
light of the recent past. One example is Into the New Millennium, a
symposium sponsored by the State Bar of Texas and published in the
Texas Bar Journal.7 One of the contributions offered a sober assess-
ment of the future: "The practice of law is not an island-it is very
much a part of a changing business world. Change has become the
norm in business, and the legal industry is not immune to it." 8
The constant of change was not new among American lawyers in
2000.9 Significant changes in the economics of the practice of law had
been the norm for many lawyers since the 1970s.10 During the 1970s,
the profession as a whole faced both governmental and market-based
threats to the claims of exclusivity in the practice of law.1 1 Lawyers
increasingly sold their services to corporations at the expense of indi-
5. See, e.g., John A. Anthes, Jr., How to Use RFPs ... and Other Tips from a Legal
Industry Supplier, 7 LEGAL ADMIN. 38 (1988) (on selling "law office systems").
6. See David Margolick, A Trendmeister for Law Firms Finds his Counsel is
Highly Coveted as Times Turn Tough, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1990, at B5 (discussing state
of legal industry); Don Samuelson & Marilyn Giblin, A Little Legal History Should
Teach Us a Lot, 9 LEGAL MGMT. 12, 13 (1990) (noting "the American legal industry re-
sembles the American automobile industry" in focusing on producer interests rather
than the needs of consumers). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF COM. BUREAU OF ECON.
ANALYSIS, https://www.bea.gov (last visited February 28, 2018) (using "legal services in-
dustry" in discussing the economic contribution of private legal services when account-
ing for the components of gross domestic product).
7. See Into the New Millennium, 63 TEx. B.J. 18 et seq. (2000).
8. Michael M. Boone & Terry W. Conner, Change, Change, and More Change: The
Challenge Facing Law Firms, 63 TEx. B.J. 18, 18 (2000).
9. See ABA COMM'N ON RESEARCH ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION,
WORKING NOTES: DELIBERATIONS ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(August 31, 2001).
10. See Richard Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers?
Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 431, 448 (1989) (noting the
income decline during the 1970s); RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 160 (1989) (not-
ing surveys by several state bars indicating income of lawyers had stalled or declined
both during early 1970s and in latter half of decade).
11. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice entered into an agreement with the ABA to change its
Code of Professional Responsibility to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in
1976, and the Supreme Court held factual commercial speech by lawyers was protected
by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, making the Code's ban on lawyer
advertisements unconstitutional.
674 [Vol. 51
ETHICS IN THE LEGAL INDUSTRY
vidual clients.12 During the 1980s, large law firms began replacing
lockstep partner compensation based on length of firm service with
"eat what you kill" compensation systems, in part to stem the depar-
ture of rainmakers.13 Lawyers of all types were increasingly sorted
into specialized practice compartments.14 Further, a continued in-
crease in the size of the American legal profession relative to popula-
tion increased competition among lawyers. As always, some practice
areas grew and others shriveled. One satisfying constant was the con-
tinued growth of legal services as a share of Gross Domestic Product,
rising from .4% in 1978 to 1.8% in 2003.15
This overall economic success failed to cheer up many lawyers, as
the race for ever-increasing profits per partner became the focus of
many law firms.16 By the end of the twentieth century it was com-
monplace to declare that lawyers were part of an unhealthy and un-
ethical profession,17 and to complain, as Chief Justice Warren Burger
did, that the "standing of the legal profession is perhaps at its lowest
ebb in this century-and perhaps at its lowest in history."'8
The Texas Bar Journal authors accurately predicted that the
norm of change would substantially affect the work performed by law-
yers. The same norm that reconfigured the economics of law practice
also triggered a transformation of the language used by lawyers to
describe their purpose and practice in the early twenty-first century.
In the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2007-2009,19 the increased
12. See Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its
Users, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1369 (2006).
13. See generally KIM ISAAC EISLER, SHARK TANK: GREED, POLITICS, AND THE COL-
LAPSE OF FINLEY KUMBLE, ONE OF AMERICA'S LARGEST LAW FIRMS (1990) (tracing rise
and fall of firm that grew and crumbled in the 1980s by hiring lateral partners); MILTON
C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER 44-49 (2005).
14. See Michael Ariens, Know the Law: A History of Legal Specialization, 45 S.C. L.
REV. 1003 (1994); Michael Ariens, Sorting: Legal Specialization and the Privatization of
the American Legal Profession, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 579 (2016). The pioneering
work on the two hemispheres of legal practice was done by JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0.
LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982) and followed
up in John P. Heinz, Edward 0. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson & Ethan Michelson, The
Changing Character of Lawyers' Work: Chicago in 1975 and 1995, 32 LAw & Soc'Y REV.
751 (1998) and JOHN P. HEINZ, ROBERT L. NELSON, REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & ETHAN
MICHELSON, URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005).
15. Marc Galanter, supra note 12, at 1378. As Galanter notes, this does not in-
clude the contribution to GDP by lawyers employed by corporations or by the
government.
16. See William D. Henderson, Rise and Fall, AM. LAW., June 2014, at 56.
17. Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Un-
happy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 EMORY L.J. 871 (1999).
18. Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 949,
950 (1995).
19. The Great Recession officially began in last quarter of 2007 and ended in June
2009. See When Did It End?, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 15, 2010), https://www.economist
.com/node/15911334. See Eli Wald, Foreword: The Great Recession and the Legal Pro-
2018]
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use of the phrase "legal industry" by the New York Times (the "Times")
further demonstrates this transformation of language. The Times'
weekly column At the Bar discussed the "legal industry" in a profile of
the owner of a legal recruiting firm in 1990.20 The Times began using
the phrase more often after the turn of the millennium, especially be-
ginning in 2009.21
The use of this language by the Times reflected a greater attach-
ment to adopting the appellation in publications written for and by
lawyers. Monthly general interest bar association journals rarely de-
fined the work of lawyers as an act of a legal industry before the Great
Recession.2 2 Law reviews embraced the term less often than bar jour-
nals. However, like bar journal authors, those writing for law reviews
discussed the "legal industry" more often after the Great Recession
than before.2 3 Further, the phrase has been used recurrently in re-
cent online internet publications, often in reference to claims about
future technological innovations and changes which are predicted to
disrupt the traditional work of lawyers.24 Relatedly, one large law
firm consultant and former lawyer offered a measured and lengthy
assessment of the legal industry online in the aftermath of the Great
Recession. When his ideas were later published in 2013 in book form,
the Foreword, which was written by a large law firm Chairman and
fession, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2051 (2010) (offering early assessment of "devastating"
effects of the Great Recession on American legal profession).
20. Margolick, supra note 6, at B5. This column is reprinted in DAVID MARGOLICK,
AT THE BAR: THE PASSIONS AND PECCADILLOES OF AMERICAN LAwYERS 79 (1995).
21. My thanks to Jacob Cox, a member of the Law Dean's Research Fellows, who
compiled a list of articles in the New York Times using the term "legal industry" from
1990 through 2014. "Legal industry" was used about once a year until 2000, two to
three times per year from 2000-08, and reached a peak of eighteen uses in 2012. See
Memorandum from Jacob Cox to Michael Ariens (on file with author). See also Sara
Randazzo, Pair of Law Firms to Merge, Adding to Industry Trend, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6,
2017, at B3 (noting mergers "are among the largest in the legal industry this year").
22. One perceptive article published just before the Great Recession using "indus-
try" is Paul Burton, Sowing the Seeds of Success, OR. ST. B. BULL., July 2007, at 38
(noting long-developing trends that mean "young lawyers are faced with a more compet-
itive, less supportive, crowded industry across a larger geographic landscape that is
more focused on financial results than developmental prospects").
23. See Michael Callier & Achim Reeb, The Industrial Age of Law: Operationaliz-
ing Legal Practice Through Process Improvement, 93 OR. L. REV. 853, 855 (2015) (titling
one section "The Legal Industry at a Glance: The New Normal"). See also David Katz,
Quantitative Legal Prediction-Or-How I Stopped Worrying and Began to Prepare for
the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L. J. 909 (2013).
24. See, e.g., Sally Kane, 10 Trends Reshaping the Legal Industry, available at
www.thebalance.com/trends-reshaping-legal-industry-2164337 (last visited February
28, 2018); The Future of the Legal Industry, FORBES (Nov. 10, 2016, 8:00 AM), www
.forbes.com/sites/forbeslegalcouncil/2016/11/10/the-future-of-the-legal-industry/2/#174e
5e412c2c; Sarah Eshlwanl, Four Trends that are Shaping Legal Industry in 2018, MAR-
TINDALE (Jan. 17, 2018), www.martindale.com/marketyourfirm/blog/four-trends-in-the-
legal-industry/.
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Chief Executive, used "legal industry" 5 times in just 1,000 words.25
Finally, Google's Ngram Viewer shows the increasing use of "legal in-
dustry" over the past quarter-century; unfortunately though, the
Ngram Viewer's data ends in 2008.26
The thesis of this essay is that this new nomenclature reflects a
lasting reframing of the ethical foundations of American lawyers. Al-
though applied most often to the work and sales opportunities sought
by large law firms, the industry model is not limited in application to
such firms. It is rare for any private practice lawyer to forego market-
ing her skills to prospective clients (or to lawyers with clients who
need her particular legal skills). Changes in technology affect all pri-
vate practice lawyers.
This essay begins by discussing the legal profession's traditional
declaration of the lawyer's purpose. Lawyers served two masters,
their clients and the courts, and they were required to serve each
faithfully. This section explains the tension lawyers faced in attempt-
ing to achieve an impossible task. The essay then turns to the ten
years from 1973 to 1983, when the American legal profession under-
went dramatic changes. This section evaluates the economic and ideo-
logical shifts that affected the status and income of lawyers. Section
IV then looks at the post-1983 history of American lawyers. It specifi-
cally focuses on the long-running "debate" between those who em-
braced the business of private law practice and those who sought to
emphasize the public profession of the law, particularly through the
25. Peter J. Kalis, Foreword, in BRUCE MACEWEN, GROWTH IS DEAD: Now WHAT? i-
iv (2013).




B%2CcO (last visited February 28, 2018).
Although "legal industry" pales in comparison with uses of "legal profession," it has
made up ground on "health care industry." Health care industry was used thirty-five
times more than "legal industry" in 1999, but just fourteen times more than legal indus-










%3B%2CcO%3B%3BLegal%2OIndustry%3B%2CcO (last visited February 28, 2018). The
phrase "knowledge industry" is used more than twice as often as "legal industry" in
2008, and more than thirty-five times as often during the peak use of"knowledge indus-
try" in 1985. Id.
2018] 677
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professionalism movement. The interest and attention paid by the
ABA and other bar organizations in inculcating professionalism was a
consequence of those shocks to lawyers during the 1970s and early
1980s. These challenges sharpened the disagreement among lawyers
and lawyer organizations of the fundamental duties of the working
lawyer.
27
Those fundamental disagreements occasionally arose in the late
1990s and early 2000s. However, during much of these bookend de-
cades an economic boom made it easier for many lawyers to paper over
their differences.28 Like a receding tide, the 2007-2009 Great Reces-
sion bared those differences. Large law firms fired, laid off, or re-
scinded offers to over 5,000 lawyers and more non-lawyer employees,
in an effort to maintain profit margins as client work, and thus bill-
ings, declined.2 9 Nearly a dozen large law firms went bankrupt when
revenue fell and the large amount of debt taken on to pay their part-
ners went unpaid.30 The New York law firm of Dewey & Leboeuf
managed the dubious distinction of both becoming the largest law firm
to file for bankruptcy and having several of its executives indicted on
charges of fraud.3 1 The Great Recession increased the pace at which
27. See Michael Ariens, The Last Hurrah: The Kutak Commission and the End of
Optimism, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 689, 736-41 (2016) (discussing impact of debates on
final version of Model Rules of Professional Conduct adopted in 1983).
28. New law graduates found jobs at a low rate from 1991-1995, during and after
the recession of 1991-1992, but between 1996 and 2010 the employment rate nine
months after graduation was always higher than 88%. See Class of 2010 Graduates
Faced Worst Job Market Since 1990s: Longstanding Employment Patterns Interrupted,
NALP (June 1, 2010), www.nalp.org/2010selectedfmdingsrelease. See also James G.
Leipold, The Stories Behind the Numbers: Jobs for New Grads Over More Than Two
Decades NALP (Dec. 2016), httpJ/www.nalp.org/1216research (listing data on employ-
ment of new law graduates from 1994).
29. See Eli Wald, Foreword: The Great Recession and the Legal Profession, 78
FoRDHAM L. REV. 2051, 2051 n.3 (2010) (citing internet site Law Shucks that 5,632
lawyers and 8,715 staff were let go from large law firms between January 1, 2008 and
January 31, 2010). As noted in Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle:
Economic Perspectives on the Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 1, 29 (2011), the staff category included "staff attorneys and contract attor-
neys as well as nonlawyer staff." The lawshucks.com website is no longer available, and
searches take one to abovethelaw.com. See STEVEN J. HARPER, THE LAWYER BUBBLE: A
PROFESSION IN CRISIS 99-132 (2013) (discussing efforts of law firms to maintain profit
margins at this time); Deborah Jones Merritt, What Happened to the Class of 2010?
Empirical Evidence of Structural Change in the Legal Profession, 2015 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1043 (2015) (noting the concussive effect of the Great Recession on newly-admitted
lawyers).
30. See Concurrent Session: Law Firm Insolvencies from Finley to Dewey: What
Have We Learned?, 2013 AM. BANKR. INST. 109 (listing bankruptcies of law firms
from 1986-2012, including 18 from 2008-2012).
31. See HARPER, supra note 29, 133-54. See Matthew Goldstein, Mistrial is De-
clared in Dewey & Leboeuf Case, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 15, 2015 at B1 (reporting details
regarding acquittal of most charges for executives, the deadlocked jury, and the court's
declaration of a mistrial).
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law firms, particularly large firms, sorted themselves.32 It also gener-
ated substantial efforts to further use technology to provide legal ser-
vices faster and cheaper.33 Most importantly, the Great Recession
made visible that the omnipresent purpose of many large law firms
was the same as other industries: maximizing profits.
The Great Recession did not cause some private practice lawyers
to think of themselves and their work as part of an industry. Instead,
it provided an impetus for them to make more public an argument for
an even more focused fidelity to clients. Expansive claims by lawyers
of the duty to remain faithful to serving the interests and needs of
their paying clients also benefitted the financial interests of lawyers.
These claims justified minimizing the talk of any competing duty
owed by lawyers to third parties, the public, and the legal system. The
contours of the debate concerning the duties owed by a lawyer are cen-
turies-old: what are private practice lawyers forbidden to do for their
paying clients?34 A long-standing and central conception of the law-
yer was as a public professional. The private practice lawyer served
the public by both representing clients in need of legal services and by
maintaining and improving the American legal system. If the practice
of law was defined explicitly as an industry, lawyers were more read-
ily able to argue the claims of client were the predominant or even
exclusive standard by which lawyers' behavior was judged.
Lawyer-futurists predict a transformation of the legal profession
in Western societies.3 5 This transformation, some argue, will reorder
the practice of law. One traditional idea that may be swept away is
that of lawyers as professionals. Private practice lawyers have argua-
bly differed from other merchants because the former are constrained
by the legal profession's oath and its rules of ethics, which are limits
inapplicable to merchants. Those limits are a substantial part of what
allows lawyers to declare the practice of law is a profession. These
32. See, e.g., Aric Press, The Super Rich Get Richer, AM. LAW., May 2014, at 130
(discussing 2013 financial results of Am Law 100); Chris Johnson, Rich and Richer, AM.
LAW., May 2015, at 98.
33. See John 0. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Ma-
chine Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services,
82 FORDHAM. L. REV. 3041 (2014); Callier & Reeb, supra note 24, at 858-64.
34. I have discussed this in Michael Ariens, The Rise and Fall of Social Trustee
Professionalism, 2016 PROF. LAW. 49.
35. See RICHARD SUSSEIND, ToMoRRow's LAWYERS vii (2013) ("We are, I have no
doubt, on the brink of fundamental change in the world of law."); id. at xiii (predicting
work of lawyers will change "more radically over the next two decades" than in previous
two centuries); THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERIcAN LAWYER 3 (2010) ("The
premise of this book is that lawyers are facing fundamental changes in both what they
will be asked to do and whether the work they once did will continue to be done by
lawyers at all."); BRUCE MAcEWEN, TOMORROWLAND: SCENARIOS FOR LAW FiRms BEYOND
THE HORIZON (2017); MITCHELL KOwALsKI, AVOIDING ExTINCTION: REIMAGINING LEGAL
SERVICES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2012).
20181
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limits may constrain lawyer behavior, but also permit lawyers to ring
off the provision of legal services by non-lawyers offering the same at a
lower price. A re-definition of the private practice of law linked to an
industry model has emerged as a rising ideology of the purpose of pri-
vate practice lawyers, which is a purpose that may have eclipsed the
ideology of the public profession of the law. This essay concludes by
arguing that, if lawyers are wholly in the market, then consumers of
legal services should reap the benefits of such a market.
II. THE LAWYER'S TWO MASTERS
An oath of admission to the bar used by several American colonies
required the declarant in part to swear, "you shall use yourself in the
office of an attorney within the court according to the best of your
learning and discretion, and with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to your clients."3 6 Samuel Johnson's 1755 Dictionary of the English
Language defined "fidelity" as "1. Honesty; veracity. 2. Faithful adher-
ence."3 7 Noah Webster's 1828 Dictionary ofAmerican English defined
"fidelity" as "Faithfulness; careful and exact observance of duty, or
performance of obligations.'38 The lawyer's oath divided his faithful
adherence to and exact observance of duty between client and court.
Though he was (ordinarily) paid by his client to undertake the client's
cause to the best of his ability, the lawyer also swore an oath to "use
yourself' with that same fidelity to the court.
Since most American lawyers through all of American history
have practiced law to earn a living, they have a strong incentive to
incline to their client's desires in case of a conflict of fidelity. A revolu-
tionary era quip may have declared what the public believed was the
likely result of this incentive: "Anoint the lawyer, grease him in the
Fist, And he will plead for thee, even what thou list."3 9 A lawyer who
pleaded whatever his paying client wished was unfaithful to the court.
Such pleadings might mislead the court into issuing an unjust deci-
sion or into wrongly delaying resolution of the matter, causing a de-
nial of justice by delaying it. The dilemma created by this oath of
office was in giving lawyers two masters, client and court. How then,
36. See, e.g., JOSIAH HENRY BENTON, THE LAWYER'S OFFICIAL OATH AND OFFICE 71
(1909) (quoting 1714 New Hampshire oath); CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AmER-
IcAN BAR 71 (1911); Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-
Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. Rev. 1385 (2004) (providing a detailed study of the history of
the oath of admission of lawyers).
37. 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE n.p. (Arno Press
1967) (1755).
38. 1 NOAH WEBSTER, A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH n.p. (Johnson Reprint
Co. 1970) (1828).
39. EVARTS BOUTELLE GREENE, THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION: 1763-1790 at 86
(1943) (late colonial era doggerel).
[Vol. 51
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could this dilemma be resolved? More particularly, American private
practice lawyers needed to answer the question, whom does a lawyer
serve?
One brief and very early solution was to eliminate this conflict of
duties by eliminating from the courts lawyers who worked for the fees
they received. A seventeenth century Virginia law looked to reduce
the lawyers' conflict of fidelity by prohibiting "mercenary" attorneys
from representing clients in court. Eleven years later it was clear that
the absence of paid attorneys from the courts meant an absence of
nearly all attorneys, as well as an inefficient system of justice. This
law was repealed.
40
As legislatures accepted the presence of the mercenary attorney, a
second approach, taken in the late colonial and early national periods,
to resolve the problem of serving two masters was to adopt stringent
rules of admission to the bar. For example, the would-be lawyer in
New York in the late eighteenth century was required to spend seven
years in training before he was eligible for admission to the bar.4 1 Un-
til 1831, Maryland required those seeking admission to the bar to un-
dertake three years of legal study and to satisfy examiners assessing
the applicant's fitness to practice law. One commentator believed
these standards "may have helped keep the bar's reputation intact" in
the early national era.42 These standards effectively equated time
with money, assuming that any applicant financially able to expend
three years (or more) of time learning the law would be less likely to
grasp for fees when doing so compromised the lawyer's fidelity to the
court. Whether this was empirically so is unknown. By the 1830s,
this approach was abandoned as standards for admission to the bar
were lessened by most states.43 It was not until the end of the nine-
teenth century that more stringent standards were reinstituted in a
number of states.
A third approach taken by lawyers in disparate eras was to ap-
peal to the ideal of a legal profession as distinct from a business. A
legal professional was distinguished from a merchant in the manner
in which the legal professional sold his services in the market. A
40. See BENTON, supra note 36, at 103-04.
41. 2 ANTON-HERMAN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA
164 (1965).
42. Dennis R. Nolan, The Effect of the Revolution on the Bar: The Maryland Experi-
ence, 62 VA. L. REV. 969, 993 (1976) (noting additionally reduction to two years in 1831).
The act easing admission to the bar is Ch. 268, § 2, Laws of Maryland-1831, at 1032.
See 2 CHROUST, supra, note 42 at 259 (noting change in admissions standards in
Maryland).
43. For an unhappy telling of this change, see ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM
ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 223-49 (1953) (calling era from 1830s through the end of
the Civil War "The Era of Decadence").
2018]
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
merchant entered into a transaction with another bound by the condi-
tions demanded by the customer. A merchant could refuse to do busi-
ness with a customer because the demands were too great, but any
demands to which the merchant consented were part of the transac-
tion. In most transactions in which the merchant was selling services,
the law of principal and agent required the merchant-agent to perform
the duties demanded by the customer-principal. In this sense, the
merchant was dependent upon the customer. In providing legal ser-
vices to customer-clients, the lawyer declared independence from both
the paying client and the public. As to the former, in the words of
Justice Robert H. Jackson, the lawyer was "no mere hired hand."
4 4
Regarding the latter, the lawyer claimed independence from the pas-
sions of the public when representing the ostracized client. John Ad-
ams recounted, in his unpublished autobiography, his reasons for
defending Captain Thomas Preston in what became known as the Bos-
ton Massacre.45 Adams wrote (possibly for posterity's sake) that he
"had no hesitation in" defending Preston. Counsel "ought to be the
very last thing that an accused Person should want in a free Country.
That the Bar ought in my opinion to be independent and impartial at
all Times And in every Circumstance."4 6 In his reminiscence, Adams
then noted he was accused of taking Preston's defense for "great fees,"
and after refuting that assertion, he stated that he was "hazarding a
Popularity and very hardly earned: and for incurring a Clamour and
popular Suspicions and prejudices, which are not yet worn out and
never will be forgotten as long as History of the Period is read."
4 7
A lawyer who was dependent on a client or influenced by the pas-
sions of the public lacked an essential attribute of professional iden-
tity. Such a lawyer was a mere servant, a hired hand. The particular
claim of independence from the clients employing the lawyers led law-
yers to argue that service, not income, was their ultimate purpose.
The lawyers incidentally received fees after providing competent ser-
vice, but income was not their principal aim. This claim was made
across the centuries. For example, when John Adams was sworn in as
an attorney in 1758, his sponsor Jeremiah Gridley advised him,
"[P]ursue the Study of the Law rather than the Gain of it. Pursue the
Gain of it enough to keep out of the Briars, but give your main Atten-
44. Robert H. Jackson, The County-Seat Lawyer, 36 A.B.A. J. 497, 497 (1950). See
generally Ariens, supra note 14.
45. See HILLER B. ZOBEL, THE BOSTON MASSACRE (1970); ERIC HINDERAKER, Bos-
TON'S MASSACRE (2017).
46. 3 JOHN ADAMS, DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 293 (4 vols., L. H.
Butterfield ed., 1961).
47. 3 ADAMS, supra note 46, at 293-94.
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tion to the study of it." 4s In an 1868 memorial to New York City law-
yer Daniel Lord, elite lawyer William Evarts extolled Lord because
"[he never overlooked the fact that the profession of the law, in and of
itself, was not the pursuit of gain," but "its rewards were in the service
of the public. '4 9 Nearly a century later, former Harvard Law School
Dean Roscoe Pound defined profession. Pound claimed that
"[h]istorically, there are three ideas involved in a profession: organiza-
tion, learning, and a spirit of public service. These are essential. The
remaining idea, that of gaining a livelihood, is incidental."50 Finally,
Warren Burger, in decrying the end of professionalism within the le-
gal profession in the mid-1990s, declared, "[t]he law is not and never
has been a 'business.'"5 1
The emphases on public service and independence were intended
to dull the public perception that the fees paid to lawyers by their cli-
ents made them corruptible to the siren song of wealth. Over time,
lawyers slightly altered this argument: their independence in repre-
senting private clients itself constituted public service. This assertion
developed in several stages. First, a lawyer represented a party with
a questionable legal case to ensure proper application of the rule of
law. Second, the lawyer represented the client with a "bad cause" be-
cause the lawyer's job was not to pre-judge a client's case, but to make
the client's claim as strongly as possible.5 2 The lawyer then left to the
judge and jury the decision of whether the lawyer had in fact advo-
cated a bad cause. Later, and more controversially, the lawyer demon-
strated his commitment to public service by representing with "warm
zeal" the "guilty client," the social outcast, in spite of the outraged pas-
sions of the community.5 3 A lawyer's decision to represent a client
despised by the community eventually served as the best and highest
example of public service. The lawyer did so because this service em-
braced the ideal that all persons, even the most contemptible, should
be tried and punished according to the rule of law, and not by the
community's passions. The lawyer's independence of judgment and
position from both client and public was, lawyers argued, the funda-
48. 1 ADAMS, supra note 46, at 55.
49. William M. Evarts, Address of Hon. William M. Evarts in MEMORIAL OF DANIEL
LORD 63, 74 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1869).
50. Roscoe Pound, What Is a Profession? The Rise of the Legal Profession in Antiq-
uity, 19 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 203, 204 (1944). ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQ-
UITY TO MODERN TnsMS 5 (1953) Pound slightly modified the definition of profession. Id.
51. Burger, supra note 18, at 949.
52. Timothy Walker, Ways and Means of Professional Success: Being the Substance
of a Valedictory Address to the Graduates of the Law Class, in the Cincinnati College, 1
W. L.J. 542, 547 (1844).
53. See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AiMs AND DUTIES OF
THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW 24 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson 1854).
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mental reason why lawyers were crucial to the success of a republic.
54
The requirements in the codes of ethics that the lawyer serve clients
diligently and zealously protected the advocate from the community's
passions. Ethical limits on the lawyer's behavior thus protected both
clients and the public.
55
Lawyers have used the codes of ethics more broadly to reinforce
their understanding of how to serve two masters. These codes de-
manded that lawyers serve both client and the public. Implicit argu-
ments concerning the restraints created by ethics code were (1) no
gentleman would practice law without regard to the precepts of the
codes, and (2) no rational lawyer would risk losing his license to prac-
tice law by violating the standards of attorney conduct. Both of these
arguments were found wanting by lawyers critical of the actions of
other members of the bar. The first argument foundered on the dis-
covery that many lawyers were not gentlemen subject to a standard of
honorable behavior. The second argument, as critics noted time and
again during much of the twentieth century, assumed an unproven
fact: that any system of lawyer discipline tempered the actions of the
lawyer willing to serve any needs of the client. A prominent Boston
lawyer declared in an 1896 speech to the ABA, "I know of no Bar in the
country which attempts to purge itself with any thoroughness."
56
Three-quarters of a century later, Justice Tom Clark's report for the
ABA on the status of state bar disciplinary programs concluded disci-
pline of lawyers for unprofessional or even criminal behavior was
"practically nonexistent."57
Ethics codes also brought a related difficulty to a resolution: even
if no conflict existed between the client's needs and the public's inter-
est, how did both client and public know that the lawyer would not put
his own interests ahead of all others? The codes told lawyers not to do
so. The duty of the lawyer was to place the client's interests before the
lawyer's contrary self-interests. Canon 6 of the ABA's 1908 Canons of
Professional Ethics declared, "[t]he obligation to represent the client
with undivided fidelity" forbade the lawyer from aiding himself by
serving other paying clients whose interests were adverse to the ini-
tial client.58 Disciplinary Rule 5-101(A) of the 1969 Code barred the
54. See generally PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY: LAW AS A PUBLIC
PROFESSION (1999).
55. See 1 CHROUST, supra note 41, at 90 (noting a similar set of reasons).
56. Joseph B. Warner, The Responsibilities of the Lawyer, 19 A.B.A. REP. 319, 339
(1896).
57. ABA SPEC. COMMN ON EvAL. OF DISCISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1" (1970) (Clark Report). See also
Ariens, supra note 16, at 86 (noting recurring twentieth century complaint that bar
disciplinary system was wanting).
58. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 6 (AM. BAR. ASS'N 1908).
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lawyer from accepting employment if the lawyer's "professional judg-
ment" "may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or
personal interests.'59 Model Rule 1.7(a)(2) barred a lawyer from rep-
resenting a client if "there is a significant risk that the representation
... will be materially limited by the . . . personal interest of the
lawyer."
60
Lawyers believe that together, these declarations and measures
created, an unusual but defensible approach to easing the tension
found in trying faithfully to serve two masters. As noted in a footnote
to the preamble and preliminary statement of the 1969 code:
The grounds for the lawyer's peculiar obligations are to be
found in the nature of his calling. The lawyer who seeks a
clear understanding of his duties will be led to reflect on the
special services his profession renders to society and the ser-
vices it might render if its full capacities were realized.
61
This was an optimistic statement delivered at a generally opti-
mistic time among American lawyers.
62
Despite the repeated assertions that lawyers limited their appe-
tite for monetary gain, the claim that law has been reduced to nothing
more than a "business" has had a long shelf life. For example, New
York lawyer Theron Strong complained in his 1914 memoir of a shift
in the practice of New York lawyers from the 1870s. To him, it ap-
peared that lawyers working for "important business interests" had
become "little more than a paid employee, bound hand and foot to the
service of his employer.'63 Such lawyers lacked independence from
their clients, and it appeared they were "almost completely deprived of
free moral agency and.., virtually owned and controlled by the client
.... " John Dos Passos made a similar argument in his 1907 assess-
ment of American lawyers. He accused lawyers of the early twentieth
century of failing to follow their predecessors' path by seeking wealth
rather than performing service.64 A number of lawyers writing at this
time agreed with Strong and Dos Passos; law had devolved from a pro-
fession to a business.
65
59. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A) (AM. BAR. ASS'N 1969).
60. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR. ASS'N 2015).
61. Preamble and Preliminary Statement, MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
n.7 (AM. BAR. ASS'N 1969) (quoting Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Con-
ference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1159 (1958)).
62. See Michael Ariens, The Agony of Modern Legal Ethics, 1970-1985, 5 ST.
MARY'S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 134, 159-71 (2014) (discussing discontent
among "movement" lawyers during late 1960s).
63. THERON G. STRONG, LANDMARKS OF A LAWYER's LIFETIME 354 (1914).
64. JOHN Dos PAssos, THE AMERICAN LAWYER-As HE WAs-As HE IS-As HE
CAN BE (1907 .
65. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? (1916); Robert
Treat Platt, The Decadence of Law as a Profession and its Growth as a Business, 12
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When the ABA adopted its Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Model Rules") in 1983, the Preamble was titled A Lawyer's Responsi-
bilities, and the first paragraph declared, "A lawyer is a representa-
tive of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having
special responsibility for the quality of justice."66 The Model Rules
thus traditionally framed the lawyer's duties: the lawyer represented
clients and served the interests of the legal system and the public.
This statement of the lawyer's multiple responsibilities was found
in the initial discussion draft of January 1980, the second discussion
draft, and the Proposed Final Draft. In each of those drafts, however,
the order of the first two of the lawyer's duties was different. The lan-
guage in the drafts stated, "[a] lawyer is an officer of the legal system,
a representative of clients, and a public citizen having special respon-
sibility for the quality of justice.'6 7 This reversal of order was inten-
tional. The Kutak Commission that drafted the Model Rules, and the
House of Delegates of the ABA that enjoyed the authority to adopt,
amend, or reject the Rules, possessed sharply different views of the
priority of the lawyer's duties to each master. For the members of the
Kutak Commission, an overarching goal of the Model Rules was to
elevate the work of lawyers as members of a public profession.68 For
many of the bar entities represented in the House of Delegates, the
Model Rules were supposed to recognize the overriding interest of law-
yers in representing their clients.
When the debate ended, the House won. The lawyer's duties to
client were emphasized at the expense of the lawyer's duties to third
parties, to the public, and to the legal system. This debate was trans-
formative, ending one era and introducing another, one in which many
providers of legal services did well economically but also one in which
many in the profession were anxiety-ridden, unsure of their status,
and unhealthy and unhappy.
The following section attempts to explain why this transformation
happened.
III. ECONOMIC AND IDEOLOGICAL HEADWINDS, 1973-1983
In An Extraordinary Time, author Marc Levinson pinpoints the
end of exceptional economic growth in the post-World War II era de-
YALE L. J. 441 (1903); George F. Shelton, Law as a Business, 10 YALE L. J. 275 (1901);
Henry Laurens Clinton, 10 GREEN BAG 133 (1898).
66. Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (AM.
BAR. ASS'N. 1983).
67. See, e.g., Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N, Discussion Draft Jan. 30, 1980).
68. See Ariens, supra note 27, at 701-06 (discussing ethos of Commission).
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veloped world as October 1973, when the Arab oil embargo began.6 9
The embargo was imposed against the United States, among others,
two weeks after the onset of the Yom Kippur War on October 6, when
Syria and Egypt made a surprise attack on Israel.
For Americans, especially American lawyers, October 1973 was
both an extraordinary and consequential month for additional rea-
sons. Vice President Spiro Agnew, a lawyer, resigned from office after
pleading no contest to a charge of tax evasion.70 Agnew had taken
bribes from public contractors as Governor of Maryland. He continued
to do so as Vice President. Agnew failed to report receiving those mon-
ies on his tax return, thus evading a required tax on that illegal in-
come.7 1 Even more important to lawyers was President Nixon's
reaction to the developments in the investigation of the June 1972
burglary of the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the
Watergate complex. This constitutional crisis, which became known
simply as Watergate, gave rise to two significant events: the creation
of a Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities and
Attorney General Elliot Richardson's appointment of a special prose-
cutor, Harvard Law School Professor Archibald Cox.72 On Saturday,
October 20, President Richard Nixon ordered the firing of Cox. Rich-
ardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus resigned
instead of agreeing to execute Nixon's order. Solicitor General Robert
Bork, the third ranking officer of the Department of Justice, fired
Cox.7 3 Eventually, the actions of twenty-nine lawyers were called to
account in the aftermath of the Watergate affair.7 4
Though the Watergate affair would soon be declared by ABA lead-
ers to have been a "lawyer's scandal,"75 October 1973 also appeared to
be the best of times for lawyers. From the late 1950s through the mid-
1960s, the ABA made assiduous efforts to increase the income of law-
69. MARC LEVINSON, AN EXTRAORDINARY TIME: THE END OF THE PoSTwAR BOOM
AND THE RETURN OF THE ORDINARY ECONOMY 1-3 (2016). Levinson offers an economic
history of the 1970s describing the end of extraordinary growth throughout the devel-
oped world beginning in 1973-1974. Id.
70. STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD
NIXON 397-98 (1990).
71. JAMES PATTERSON, GAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974 776
(1996); KUTLER, supra note 70, at 391-98 (noting that "[m]oney making, before, during,
and after his tenure as Vice President-seemed to be the thing that excited Agnew
most.").
72. See KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 232-43 (1997).
73. Id. at 338-58; KUTLER, supra note 70, at 407-08.
74. N.O.B.C. Reports on Results of Watergate-Related Charges Against Twenty-nine
Lawyers, 62 A.B.A. J. 1337, 1337 (1976).
75. James D. Fellers, President's Page, 61 A.B.A. J. 529, 529 (1975) (blaming affair
on lawyers by ABA President); Richard B. Allen et al., Editorial, Watergate-A Lawyers'
Scandal, 60 A.B.A. J. 1257 (1974).
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yers.76 To make it clear that lawyers were ill paid, one ABA pamphlet
offered the title The 1958 Lawyer and His 1938 Dollar.77 The ABA's
efforts occurred while the percentage of lawyers among the population
fell, 78 the work of lawyers expanded, and the nation's economic output
shifted more to the production of services instead of manufacturing.
79
Beginning in the mid-1960s lawyer incomes jumped. In 1968, the
New York law firm of Cravath, Swaine, & Moore raised the pay of new
associates from $10,500 to $15,000.80 Large law firms, in desperate
need of new associates, advertised the opportunity for associates to
work in the firms' newly-created pro bono programs.8 1 By 1969, me-
dian lawyer income, measured in 1983 dollars, was $47,638.82 That
same year, the ABA House of Delegates adopted, without amendment,
a Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code") replacing the
1908 Canons of Professional Ethics.
83
The ABA increasingly promoted American lawyers as important
social leaders. The Code was intended, in part, to justify the increas-
ingly public role of the lawyer; the Preamble to the Code began by
connecting democratic society to "justice based on the rule of law," and
continued with the assertion that "Lawyers as guardians of the law,
play a vital role in the preservation of society."
84
This vital role was also an active role. The ABA promoted the
creation of a federal program providing legal services to the poor in
early 1965,85 defended the program against efforts to abolish it, 8 6 and
successfully urged Congress to form the Legal Services Corporation in
1974. The following year the ABA House of Delegates adopted the
76. See Ariens, supra note 34, at 63-68 (discussing work of Special Committee on
Economics of Law Practice).
77. ABA SPEC. COMM'N ON ECON. OF L. PRAc., THE 1958 LAWYER AND His 1938
DOLLAR (1958 REPR. 1959).
78. ABEL, supra note 10, at 280 table 22 (noting change in number of lawyers com-
pared with change in population in period from 1940-1963).
79. See BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED
AMERICA is TEARING Us APART 214 n.* (2008) (citing June 28, 1965, New York Times
article reporting shift from an "industrial economy" to a "service economy"). See gener-
ally DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL
FORECASTING (1973).
80. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TR.ANSFOR-
MATION OF THE BIG LAW FirM 24 (1991).
81. See Ariens, supra note 34, at 75 (noting creation of pro bono programs by large
law firms to entice new lawyers to join).
82. Sander & Williams, supra note 10, at 448.
83. See Proceedings of the 1969 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 94 A.B.A.
REP. 378, 389-92 (1969).
84. Preamble, MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (AM. BAR AsS'N 1969).
85. See House of Delegates Proceedings, 90 A.B.A. REP. 95, 110-11 (1965).
86. See John D. Robb, Controversial Cases and the Legal Services Program, 56
A.B.A.J. 329, 329 (1970) (making second successful argument for its continued
existence).
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conclusion of a Special Committee on Public Interest Practice that it
was "a basic responsibility of each lawyer engaged in the practice of
law to provide public interest services."8
7
The belief that lawyers were well positioned to protect the public's
interest was the foundation for the conclusion of a 1973 study of large
New York City law firms. The author called for elite lawyers to take a
greater role in protecting the public good. Such lawyers should be-
come "more detached, more independent, someone paid by the client
but responsible to the general public."88
The extent of the ABA's influence on legal ethics may be demon-
strated by the Code's adoption by states. The ABA created a special
committee to promote the adoption of the Code. Less than three years
after its approval by the ABA, the Code had been adopted as law in
forty-three jurisdictions.8 9 Further, four other state bar associations
adopted the Code as applicable to their members.90 When adopting
the Code of Professional Responsibility most states or state bar as-
sociations made few amendments to the ABA Code. None of those
amendments, the special committee reported, were "fundamental."9 1
Another sign of good times for the legal profession was the ex-
traordinary increase in law students. The baby boom, beginning in
1946, offered a massive number of young adults as prospective law
students. Social changes joined this demographic wave to aid in filling
law school seats. The women's liberation movement helped generate
an increase in the number of women attending law school, from 1,064
first-year female law students in Fall 1965, to 2,103 in Fall 1969, to
7,464 in Fall 1973.92 Educational opportunities and affirmative ac-
tion helped increase the number of racial and ethnic minority stu-
dents in law schools, increasing from 4.3% of all law students in 1969,
to 7.5% in 1974, which was an absolute increase of minority students
of over 5,100. 9 3 Some men sought refuge from serving in the armed
87. See House of Delegates Proceedings, 100 A.B.A. REP. 642, 684 (1975).
88. PAUL HoFFMAN, LIONS IN THE STREET 227 (1973).
89. Report of the Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, 97 A.B.A. REP. 740, 741 (1972).
90. Report of Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, 97 A.B.A. REP. 740, 741 (1972).
91. See, e.g., Report of the Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, 96 A.B.A. REP. 676, 676 (1971).
92. ABEL, supra note 10, at 285 (listing number of women in law schools from 1940-
86). See also Statistics, AMERImAN BAR ASSOCIATION, https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/legal-education/resources/statistics.html (last visited February 28, 2018) (listing
Enrollment and other data in ABA-approved law schools from 1963 to 2012-2013).
93. ABEL, supra note 10, at 288 (listing number of minority law students from
1969-85). The number of law students in 1969 was 64,416; 4.3% of that is 2,770. Id.




forces during the Vietnam War by enrolling in law school. Finally, the
civil rights movement of the 1960s was supported by regular refer-
ences to law and justice in light of the American commitment to the
rule of law, which were claims often supported by the Supreme Court
of the United States.94 All contributed to a dramatic increase in the
number of law students. In fall 1972, the number of law students ex-
ceeded 100,000 for the first time.95 The following year all available
seats for entering law students were filled for the first time, and in
1974 "only one law school reported 'unfilled seats' in its entering
class."9 6 This occurred even as the number of ABA-approved law
schools increased from 135 in 1966-67 to 157 in Fall 1974.97 Law
school enrollment effectively doubled between 1964 and 1973.98
It may be that the best of times is also always the worst of times.
In addition to the lawyer's scandal of Watergate, lawyers once again
feared economic calamity. In the fall of 1972, the ABA created a Task
Force of Professional Utilization ("Task Force").99 The Task Force
was charged with easing the concerns of lawyers who worried about
"the increase in the number of new entrants into the profession."10 0
Shortly thereafter, Business Week magazine declared that "the outlook
for lawyers is grim."10 1 The Department of Labor projected that the
approximate 30,000 new law graduates in 1974 would find fewer than
half (14,500) that number of jobs awaiting them. Lawyer income did
drop during the 1970s, as shown in studies in Michigan, Maryland,
and Illinois during different periods of the decade.10 2 By 1979, lawyer
median income had declined to $36,716 in constant 1983 dollars, a
22.5% decrease in real income in one decade.
10 3
94. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS Pt. III
(2000).
95. ABEL, supra note 10, at 279. See also Statistics, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal-education/resources/statistics.html (last vis-
ited February 28, 2018).
96. James P. White, Is that Burgeoning Law School Enrollment Ending?, 61 A.B.A.
J. 202, 202 (1975).
97. See Statistics, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/legal education/resources/statistics.html (last visited February 28, 2018) (listing
51,079 students in 1964-65 and 101,675 in 1973-1974).
98. ABEL, supra note 10, at 279. See Statistics, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, https:/
/www.americanbar.org/groups/legal-education/resources/statistics.html (last visited
February 28, 2018).
99. See Report of the Task Force on Professional Utilization, 97 A.B.A. REP. 818,
819 (1972).
100. Id. at 819.
101. Special Report, The Job Gap for College Graduates in the '70s, Bus. WK., Sept.
23, 1972, at 48, 51.
102. ABEL, supra note 10, at 160 (noting studies).
103. Sander & Williams, supra note 10, at 448. The number of lawyers increased
from 355,242 in 1971 to 542,205 in 1980, a 53% increase, which also depressed lawyer
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Additional threats to the economic standing of lawyers included
antitrust actions filed by the Department of Justice against the
ABA 10 4 and the Supreme Court's decision holding the Virginia State
Bar Association's minimum fee schedules violated antitrust law. 1 0 5 In
1977, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a ban on lawyer ad-
vertisements,10 6 and the Federal Trade Commission joined the earlier
Department of Justice investigations by announcing its inquiry into
the American legal profession, including its possible regulation by the
FTC.1
0 7
In the aftermath of the Watergate mess, separate polls by Harris
and Gallup found only a quarter of the public was confident in lawyers
as a group or rated them highly in honesty and ethical standards.1 0 8
Lawyers were also attacked from a number of ideological perspectives.
Jerold Auerbach's critical history of the American legal profession
claimed the Code of Professional Responsibility favored the economic
self-interest of lawyers rather than the "undisputed existence of a vast
neglected public for whom legal services were unavailable."10 9 Others
also castigated the ABA and broader profession for issuing an ethics
code that protected lawyers and offered platitudes instead of
substance.110
Despite the public's low opinion of lawyers, during the 1970s law-
yers acted in ways that signaled self-interest and the interests of cli-
ents ranked ahead of the interests of the public or third parties. One
median income. Id. See SUPPLEMENT TO THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LE-
GAL PROFESSION IN 2005 2 (Clara N. Carson with Jeeyoon Park eds., 2012).
104. See Justice Department and Other Views on Prepaid Legal Services Plans Get
an Airing Before the Tunney Subcommittee, 60 A.B.A. J. 791, 792-93 (1974); Lawrence
E. Walsh, The Annual Report of the President of the American Bar Association, 62
A.B.A. J. 1119, 1120 (1976) (reporting second antitrust complaint filed against ABA).
105. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
106. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The Court held the Arizona
ban based on a prohibition found in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility was
unconstitutional. Id.
107. See F.T.C. Goes Public on Lawyer Probe, 64 A.B.A. J. 959, 959 (1978).
108. Michael Asimow, Lawyers, Popular Perception of in OXFORD COMPANION TO
AMERICAN LAW 495 (Kermit L. Hall et al., eds., 2002) (Harris Poll); Honesty/Ethics in
the Professions, GALLUP, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1654/honesty-ethics-profes-
sions.aspx (last visited February 28, 2018) (offering data from June 1976 through De-
cember 2017 and indicating number is slightly worse in 2017).
109. JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MOD-
ERN AMERICA 286 (1976).
110. See Jay M. Smyser, In-House Corporate Counsel: The Erosion of Independence,
in VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 208, 215 (Ralph Nader & Mark Green eds., 1976) (calling Code
a "monument to the profession's self-interest"); JETHRO LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR
65, 216-17 (1978) (concluding replacement of Canons by Code "was more of form than of
substance" and urging ethics code be drawn by independent body); Eric Schnapper, The
Myth of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 202, 203 (1978) (stating "[t]he Code of Professional




example was the reticence of lawyers to require disclosure of confi-
dences made by a client who committed a past crime or fraud when
represented by the lawyer. The Code initially declared:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) his client has, in the course of the representation, perpe-
trated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call
upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or
is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal.1 1 1
The lawyer thus owed a duty to disclose a past fraud to others even
absent client consent. One difficulty with this provision was that the
lawyer possessed no mandatory duty to disclose a future crime, which
would include nearly all acts of fraud.
1 12
The mandatory duty to rectify past acts of fraud was found in the
Disciplinary Rules in Canon 7 and the permissive authority to disclose
client statements concerning a future crime was found in the Discipli-
nary Rules in Canon 4. Both Canons addressed the duties of the law-
yer to the client. Canon 7 required the lawyer "represent a client
zealously within the bounds of the law."113 Canon 4 was titled "A
Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client."
1 14
This incongruity could have been smoothed by requiring lawyers
to disclose confidences relating to the commission of future crimes.
Additionally, the Code could have required the lawyer to disclose all
confidences of the client while using the lawyer's services to commit a
future act of fraud, or it could have defined future crimes only in terms
of crimes of physical violence.
Each of these resolutions required the ABA to decide which policy
was optimal as a substantive matter. Some critics would have dis-
agreed with any proposed solution. The debate, however, would have
been open, and the ABA's justifications transparent.
The ABA chose instead a solution that was the least transparent
and most protective of lawyers' clients, especially corporate clients.
The ABA decided to amend DR 7-102(B)(1) by adding a concluding
clause, "except when the information is protected as a privileged com-
munication."1 1 5 Thus, a lawyer who learned a client used the lawyer's
services to perpetrate a past fraud through a "privileged communica-
111. MODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (AM. BAR. ASS'N 1969).
112. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (AM. BAR. ASS'N 1969).
"A lawyer may reveal: . . . (3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime." Id.
113. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILiTY Canon 7 (AM. BAR. ASS'N 1969).
114. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (AM. BAR. ASS'N 1969).
115. See Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity, 99 A.B.A. REP. 262, 265 (1974). See House of Delegates Proceedings, 99 A.B.A. REP.
166 (1974) (approving the amendment without debate).
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tion" was not permitted to disclose this information without consent of
the client. What was worse was that the Standing Committee on Eth-
ics and Professional Responsibility treated this as a "housekeeping"
amendment and did not debate it as a policy matter.116 While the
absence of transparency may have been related to the desire to protect
clients, the amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1) was also a response to a
scandal involving a suit brought by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission alleging law firms possessed a duty to disclose fraud commit-
ted by their clients.
117
The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility then used that amendment to opine in 1975, in Formal
Opinion 341, that a lawyer was prohibited from disclosing an act of
fraud both when learned through a privileged communication, and
when learned otherwise in the lawyer-client relationship.1 18 The text
of the "excepting" clause was limited to "privileged communications."
Learning of acts of fraud other than through such a communication
made that clause inapplicable. Formal Opinion 341 failed to acknowl-
edge this distinction.
Since the "excepting" clause and other amendments to the Code
were brought to the House of Delegates as housekeeping amendments,
they were adopted without debate. The "excepting" clause to DR 7-
102(B) protected the client at the expense of the victim of the fraud or
the public. Formal Opinion 341 exacerbated that social cost by broad-
ening the effect of the exception. It also did so by focusing on the risks
to lawyers in such cases without ever assessing the risks of harm to
the public and third parties.
This protection of the "bad" client, often a corporate client, gener-
ated little impact on public consciousness. However, the defense of an
individual accused of barbaric crimes at the same time made larger
headlines.1 19 Robert Garrow was charged with a brutal murder, and
116. I discuss this at length in Michael Ariens, "Playing Chicken": An Instant His-
tory of the Battle over Exceptions to Client Confidences, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 239, 246-50
(2009).
117. The scandal involved National Student Marketing and its merger partner In-
terstate National Corporation. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp.,
457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding lawyers "were required to speak out at the
closing concerning the obvious materiality of the information," and their "silence was
not only a breach of this duty to speak, but in addition lent the appearance of legitimacy
to the closing"). See James M. McCauley, Corporate Responsibility and the Regulation
of Corporate Lawyers, 3 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 15, 24 (2003) (noting the fines paid
by the two law firms were $1.95 million and $1.3 million).
118. ABA Comm'n on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975). This
was, in the language of the Code, a "secret," information about the client learned not
directly from a client communication but from the representation. Id.
119. See RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMER-
icAN LAWYER 7-26 (1999) (discussing case); TOM ALIBRANDI & FRANK H. ARMANI, PRivi-
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suspected of several others. Garrow's lawyers learned from him that
he had killed several missing persons and where their bodies lay. The
lawyers verified this information by visiting the locations Garrow di-
rected them to. The lawyers claimed Garrow was insane, and at trial
he testified and admitted to committing other murders. The lawyers
held a press conference and said that they had known for a year of the
location of the bodies of those missing. The lawyers indicated that
they had not told anyone of their knowledge, including law enforce-
ment and the fathers of the two missing women who asked them if
they knew anything about their missing children.
120
In the Garrow case, the lawyers had committed no crime. The
Appellate Division thus affirmed the dismissal of the criminal charge
against Garrow's lawyers. Though the lawyers had not violated any
rule of ethics, and though the ethical behavior was not before the court
in the criminal appeal, the New York Appellate Division considered it
sufficiently important to acknowledge the public's claim on lawyers:
lawyers "also must observe basic human standards of decency, having
due regard to the need that the legal system accord justice to the in-
terests of society and its individual members."
1 21
Whether lawyers aided the legal system in providing justice to
society was in doubt by some of the public in the late 1970s. The Bur-
ied Bodies Case, as the Garrow affair became known, exemplified the
understanding of zealous advocacy at that time: the lawyer was pri-
marily a zealous advocate for his client. Garrow's lawyers considered
their duty of zeal to include finding the bodies of missing persons and
telling no one. However, the lawyer is also an officer of the court,
which generated some unspecified duties as a member of a public pro-
fession. The tension existed in the modifier. Although Monroe Freed-
man willingly staked out a position of utmost zeal for one's client,
122
most of those discussing the extent of the lawyer's duty of zealous rep-
resentation, like the New York Appellate Division, found zeal bound
by "basic standards of decency." The basic standards of decency in
representing clients were nearly always left unsaid. The Code recog-
nized but did not resolve this tension.
In 1977, less than a decade after it adopted the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, ABA President William Spann appointed a
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards. This became
known as the Kutak Commission after its chairman, Robert Kutak.
LEGED INFORMATION (1984) (first-person account by one of the lawyers for Garrow);
People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 798 (Onondaga Cnty. Ct. 1975).
120. Zitrin & Langford, supra note 119, at 11-13.
121. People v. Belge, 376 N.Y.S. 2d 771, 772 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff'd 359 N.E.2d
377 (N.Y. 1976).
122. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9-24 (1975).
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Spann's call to the Kutak Commission was to review "all facets of legal
ethics."123 It did so, creating an entirely new code, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Model Rules").
12 4
A significant number of the members of the Kutak Commission
favored drafting rules of ethics emphasizing the lawyer's duty to serve
the public as well as the client. In December 1977, at one of its initial
meetings, Commission members were asked to describe their vision of
the work of the private practice lawyer. One unnamed respondent
urged that the rules of ethics require such lawyers to act in light of "a
determinable public interest."12 5 Further, the Commission also went
out of its way to avoid using the word zeal. It was not found in either
the "leaked" Working Draft of August 1979 or the Discussion Draft of
January 1980. This was due to the Commission's suspicion of the
word: "'Zealous,' it seems, has curiously come to mean 'overzealous.'
Strong sentiment was found around the table for dropping 'zeal' alto-
gether as a descriptive term with ethical consequences. It carries with
it simply too much baggage."
126
The Kutak Commission forged ahead with the idea that the law-
yer owed duties both to client and public; the rules should reflect the
existence of two masters.12 7 Its members considered the Code a fail-
ure in part due to its thoroughgoing adoption of the "basic posture of
'my client, first, last and always,' [which] allowed little room for devel-
opment of the attorney's role as an officer of the court.
'128
By the time the Model Rules were adopted by the ABA House of
Delegates in August 1983, the ideal of the lawyer as public profes-
sional had been routed. One small but telling example is found in the
initial paragraph of the Model Rules, the Preamble: A Lawyer's Re-
sponsibilities. As adopted, it began with the declaration that a lawyer
"is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a pub-
lic citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice."12 9
Until the final version, the first two duties were in reverse order. The
lawyer "is an officer of the legal system, a representative of clients,
123. William B. Spann, Jr., The Legal Profession Needs a New Code of Ethics, BAR
LEADER, at 2-3 (Nov./Dec. 1977).
124. On the history of the Kutak Commission's efforts, see Ariens, supra note 27, at
700-21.
125. COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF ETHICAL STANDARDS JOURNALS, N.Y.C., N.Y.,
DECEMBER 16-17, 1977, at 14 (copy on file with author) [hereinafter JOURNALS].
126. JOURNALS, RESEARCH TRIANGLE PARK, N.C., Feb. 23-24, 1979, at 19-20 (copy on
file with author).
127. See Ariens, supra note 27, at 706.
128. JOURNALS, SEATTLE, WASH., JUNE 29-30, 1979, at 16 (quoting Reporter Geoffrey
Hazard).




and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice."
130
That modest change symbolized larger shifts in the legal profes-
sion. By the time the Commission's proposed final draft was issued in
May 1981, the profession's understanding of "zealous" behavior had
moved decisively in favor of the "basic posture:" the client is right first,
last, and always. This change was swift. In a 1976 Conference on
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,13 1 none of
the discussants raised any general concerns about discovery abuse.
13 2
By 1980, the profession regularly bemoaned discovery abuse in the
everyday civil case. That year an ABA Special Committee for the
Study of Discovery Abuse issued its Report, "there is serious and wide-
spread abuse of discovery.
'133
Another early warning sign of change in the legal profession was
the publication in May 1978 of a profile of the Los Angeles lawyer
Marshall Manley, who was a partner at that time in the firm of
Manatt Phelps. Manley told reporter Steven Brill, "I have no qualms
about stealing away lawyers and clients from other firms. It's the key-
stone of our program."13 4 In February 1979, Brill published the first
issue of American Lawyer magazine, a monthly that had as "its ongo-
ing focus: the money that partners at big law firms made.1 35 As Wil-
liam Henderson noted in 2012, the initial issue "managed to compare
(envy) lawyers and law firms (pride) on the metric of money
(greed).'13 6 American Lawyer doubled down on this strategy in 1985,
presenting the American Lawyer 50, a listing of the fifty most profita-
ble large firms on a per partner basis.
13 7
Beginning with the ABA Presidency of Lewis F. Powell, Jr. in
1964-1965, the ABA had worked to join the private and public inter-
ests of lawyers. It seems no mistake that Powell created the Special
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT
1981). See also Model Rules of Profl Conduct, Proposed Final Draft, 107 A.B.A. REP.
833 (1982).
131. See Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976) (publishing pa-
pers of conference). The title was, of course, a nod to Roscoe Pound's speech to the ABA
seventy years earlier. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
132. One later noted such a concern, but that applied to a small subset of federal
cases. See William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint
for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1977).
133. Philip H. Corboy, Second Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Dis-
covery Abuse (January 1980), LITIG. NEWS, Apr. 1980, at 9, 10.
134. Steven K. Brill, Building a Law Firm-Fast, ESQUIRE, May 23, 1978, at 10, 11.
135. HARPER, supra note 29, at 71.
136. Henderson, supra note 16, at 56.
137. HARPER, supra note 29, at 72. The number has varied but for some time has
been marketed as the Am Law 100 survey, which is an annual survey.
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Committee that drafted the Code of Professional Responsibility and
managed to gain House of Delegates approval of a federal program for
legal services to the poor. The creation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility was an effort to provide lawyers a better understanding
of the ethical standards to which they were bound. Support for a fed-
eral initiative to provide civil legal services to the poor was an ac-
knowledgment by the ABA that lawyers needed to do more to alleviate
that problem than they had in the 1950s. Both of these projects were
part of the lawyer's public responsibilities. The Kutak Commission
worked to continue in the Model Rules the idea that the lawyer is a
private and public actor. Unlike Powell, when seeking the support of
the broader membership, the Kutak Commission failed.138
A decade after writing a study of the influence and power of the
large New York law firm, author Paul Hoffman returned for an up-
date. These legal "lions" remained in power, but the author no longer
considered it possible for privately-paid lawyers to exercise power on
behalf of the interests of the public. Hoffman was instead worried
about the turn to profit made by New York "legal powerhouses" over
the past decade:
The Canons of Ethics may be filled with pious pronounce-
ments about an attorney's duty to his clients, to the court, to
the law of the land, and to the concept of justice, but the legal
powerhouses on Wall Street and in midtown Manhattan ex-
ist, not to chase the elusive butterflies of abstract ideals, but
to make money.
139
This was not only true of Manhattan-based law firms, but firms
across the country. The idea, as floated by Hoffman in 1973, that law-
yers in those firms might serve "less a lackey and more of an 'expert,'
more detached, more independent, someone paid by the client but re-
sponsible to the general public," seemed like an echo from a distant,
not recent, past.
140
The adoption of the Model Rules in 1983 sowed significant doubt
on the idea that private practice lawyers acted in light of "a determi-
nable public interest."141 In debating the Proposed Final Draft of the
Model Rules, the House of Delegates was regularly faced with choos-
ing between a client-centered zeal and a duty of fidelity to the public;
it usually chose the former. The House did not do so overwhelmingly,
much less unanimously. A number of the votes were relatively close,
but it appeared a tipping point had been reached. Some remnants of
138. The details of this failure are found in Ariens, supra note 27, at 736-41.
139. PAUL HOFFMAN, LIONS OF THE EIGHTIES 38 (1982).
140. HOFFMAN, supra note 88, at 227.




the officer of the legal system model remained, and some lawyers
adopted that model in their practice. Whether those remnants consti-
tuted enough to form a governing ethos for private practice lawyers
was doubtful.
IV. CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY
Speaking to the Torts and Insurance Practice Section ("TIPS") at
the 1984 Annual Meeting of the ABA, Professor Roger Cramton spoke
of the "paradox"1 42 of professional independence: "The lawyer is loyal
to his client, providing a vigorous and fearless presentation of the cli-
ent's cause. But his zeal for the client is tempered by the lawyer's
duties to the court, to adversaries and third persons, and to the pub-
lic." '14 3 The professional norms applicable to the lawyer made the law-
yer responsible both to client and to the public, "a minister of justice
as well as a champion."14 4 This bifurcated role generated two models
that explained the power exercised by lawyers: "the public-interest
model and the market model."
145
Cramton was well aware of the attractions of the market model.
It had always been easier for the private practice lawyer to do what
the paying client wanted done. Such a bias was usually a more profit-
able and less difficult path to take.146 That model also reduced the
tension found in the lawyer's role by ignoring the traditional duty of
fidelity owed by the lawyer to the public.
Between 1972 and 1987, the revenues of the largest law firms in
the United States "increased, in real dollars, an average of ten percent
per year ... more than double the rate of growth in the legal services
field generally."1 47 In just the five years between 1977 and 1982, re-
ceipts of private practice lawyers doubled to thirty-four billion dol-
142. See Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer's Professional Independence: Memories, As-
pirations, and Realities, in THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: AN IDEAL RE-
VISITED 49, 50 (John B. Davidson, ed. 1985); TIPS Notes, 14 THE BRIEF, Fall 1984, at 2,
2-3.
143. Cramton, supra note 142, at 50.
144. Id. at 51.
145. Id.
146. See Can an In-House Lawyer Say 'No' to His Boss, Bus. WK., Apr. 7, 1984, at 70
(quoting Thomas Barr of Cravath, Swaine and Moore when declaring that on occasion
his job is to say no to the client).
147. Richard Sander & E. Douglass Williams, A Little Theorizing about the Big Law
Firm: Galanter, Palay, and the Economies of Growth, 17 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 391, 392
n.4 (1992). This was not true for many lawyers during this time, who saw their real
income decline during this time due to high inflation and unemployment. See ALLEN J.
MATUSOw, NIxoN's ECONOMY: Booms, BUSTS, DOLLARS, & VOTES 214-40 (1998) (titling
post-1972 election period "The Great Inflation"); W. CARL BIVEN, JIMMY CARTER'S ECON-
OMY: POLICY IN AN AGE OF LIMITS 185-208 (2002) (titling chapter on period from 1978 on
"The Worsening Inflation"); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 57 (1995) (noting in
real dollars price of legal services fell between 1970 and 1985).
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lars,148 with much of that increase coming from businesses. Marc
Galanter found that businesses purchased 39% of legal services na-
tionally in 1967, and 47.4% in 2002.149 In constant 2000 dollars, law-
yers received from businesses $8.64 billion in 1967 and $79.61 billion
in 2002, a 900% increase.150 Not surprisingly, the growth of corporate
law firms during this time was extraordinary. In early 1968, the larg-
est law firm was Shearman and Sterling, with 169 lawyers.151 The
three firms tied for eighteenth each had 106 lawyers. In 1972, the
twenty-five largest law firms ranged in size from 110 to 240 law-
yers.1 52 Seven years later, the twenty largest law firms had a median
of 235 lawyers, with the largest consisting of 512. By 1985, the me-
dian number of lawyers in those firms was 395, which rose to 460 just
two years later.
153
Though claims were made in the early 1980s that such firms were
under profit pressures,15 4 large law firms doubled their market share
of legal services between 1972 and 1986.155 Further, beginning large
firm lawyers saw their salaries rapidly increase. In 1973, Texas
Monthly unfavorably compared the pay of new large firm lawyers in
Texas ($15,500) with that of plumbers.15 6 By 1985, those lawyers
were paid $47,000, just slightly less than the starting pay of New
York-based lawyers.157 The following year starting salaries in New
York were increased to $65,000. That salary reached $160,000 when
the Great Recession arrived.15
8
Lawyers continued during the 1980s to sort themselves into two
hemispheres: those representing individuals and those representing
corporations.159 Within those hemispheres was a further sorting of
lawyers. For those lawyers representing individuals, only the top
148. Cramtom, supra note 142, at 49.
149. Galanter, supra note 12, at 1382.
150. Id. at 1383.
151. See Why Law is a Growth Industry, Bus. WK., Jan. 13, 1968, at 78, 79 (listing
top twenty firms in size and including number of partners and associates).
152. Alexis de Tocqueville, Money Talks: Why It Shouts to Some Lawyers and Whis-
pers to Others, 2 JuaIs DOCTOR, Jan. 1972, at 54 (listing twentieth largest firm as hav-
ing 122 lawyers).
153. ABEL, supra note 10, at 311.
154. See Peter W. Bernstein, Profit Pressures on the Big Law Firms, FORBES, Apr.
19, 1982, at 84; The Big-Law Business, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 16, 1984, at 87.
155. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 80, at 41.
156. Griffin Smith, Jr., Empires of Paper, TExAS MONTHLY, Nov. 1973, at 53, 63.
157. See MICHAEL S. AR1ENS, LONE STAR LAW: A LEGAL HISTORY OF TExAS 191
(2011).
158. See Burk & McGowan, supra note 29, at 21 (listing increases in starting pay for
large law firm associates in New York from the late 1960s).
159. Compare HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 15, 140-58 (finding law firm lawyers as
of 1975 are sorted into two hemispheres of practice, those who represent individuals
and small businesses and those who represent large businesses), with HEINZ, NELSON,
SANDEFUR & LAUMANN, 29-47 (finding greater sorting by 1995).
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strata of personal injury lawyers prospered beyond ordinary economic
growth.1 60 For the latter, significant lateral partner hiring16 1 and
"eat what you kill" 1 6 2 compensation systems were joined by increases
in the consumption of legal services.
163
Lawyers representing organizations succeeded during the reces-
sion of 1991. Large firm managers were aghast that during the reces-
sion revenue growth dipped to 3% per lawyer from 9% in 1990.164 The
latter percentage itself had been a disappointment to such firms. The
recession did, however, provide an opportunity for large firms to fire
both partners and associates. Hildebrandt Inc., a law consultancy,
surveyed 105 large firms, 59% of which "terminated partners," and
93.4% of which fired associates.16 5 Further, "[cilose to two-thirds of
the firms that have already fired some partners expect to fire more in
the next 18 months."
166
The relatively modest recessions of 1991 and 2001 were just slight
interruptions to overall economic growth between 1983 and the Great
Recession in late 2007. For corporate lawyers, and particularly large
firm corporate lawyers, economic growth was superb. Writing soon
after the end of the Great Recession, former large firm lawyer Steven
Harper declared, "[a]ll attorneys in big law firms are making far more
money than they would have earned thirty years ago.' '16 7 Harper
noted that the top equity partners "earned three times more than
their lowest-paid fellow equity partner[ I" in 1985, and "more than
ten" times that in 2011.168 This "winner-take-all" approach mimicked
compensation models at large publicly-traded companies, and further
emphasized that success in large firms was marked by increases in
160. The Best-Paid Trial Lawyers, FORBES, Oct. 16, 1989, at 204; Brigid McMe-
namin, The Best Paid Lawyers, FORBES, Nov. 6, 1995, at 145. See also Ariens, supra
note 62, at 172 (discussing success of personal injury lawyers in 1970s). See STEPHEN
DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, TORT REFORM, PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS, AND ACCESS TO JUS-
TICE (2015) (reporting incomes of ordinary personal injury lawyers in Texas).
161. Burk & McGowan, supra note 29, at 15. "By 1988, over a quarter of the 500
largest U.S. firms had acquired more than half their new partners from outside the
firm." Id.
162. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 14, at xvii (quoting partner in Chicago law
firm, "[iun this firm, you eat what you kill"); PETER MEGARGEE BROWN, RASCALS: THE
SELLING OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 63 (1989) (noting large firm criticized in late 1980s
for failing "to follow the fashion at this time that you only eat what you kill").
163. See Galanter, supra note 12, at 1378-79.
164. See The Legal Profession, THE ECONOMIST, July 18, 1992, at 3, 5.
165. See Don J. DeBenedictis, Firings to Continue, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1992, at 24.
166. Id.
167. HARPER, supra note 29, at 97.
168. Id. This is confirmed in Michael D. Goldhaber, The Great Class Divide, Am.
LAW., May 2014, at 150, 150 (noting that in 1994 "most Am Law 100 firms were equity-
only partnerships," which by 2014 were down to seventeen firms); GEO. U. L. CTR., CTR.
FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROF., 2013 REP. ON THE ST. OF THE LEGAL MKT. 10 (2013)
(noting 169 of Am Law 200 reported having two-tiered partnerships).
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profits, and thus income. Such success intimately tied these lawyers
to the clients who generously contributed to their income.
Overall, the growth in legal services as a percentage of gross do-
mestic product grew remarkably from the late 1960s through 2002.
Expenditures on private practice legal services grew from .4% of GDP
in 1967 to 1.8% by 2002.169 Growth in legal services expenditures did
not end until the Great Recession. 170
By the time American Lawyer began listing profits per (equity)
partner in 1985, large law firm partners were already aware of that
metric. For the next twenty years, that metric moved in one direction.
The Great Recession meant layoffs for associates, staff attorneys, and
staff, and a more fervent "de-equitization" of partners. It also meant a
continued rise in profits per partner for those who found and kept
well-paying clients.
The push to measure success by income (profits) was met with the
pull of what became known as the professionalism movement.
The initial call for lawyers to return to the tradition of indepen-
dence from both client and society began at the ABA's Annual Meeting
in 1983.171 TIPS organized a program that year titled The Lawyer's
Professional Independence.1 72 The program was given Presidential
Showcase status and was warmly greeted, particularly within TIPS.
The incoming chairman of TIPS for the 1983-1984 year was L. S. Car-
sey, who made the topic of professional independence the subject of his
chairmanship.17 3 TIPS held a seminar on the Professional Indepen-
169. See Galanter, supra note 12, at 1378-79. Cf. ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J.
COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY: WHY THE FEW AT THE Top GET So MUCH MORE
THAN THE REST OF Us 219 (1995) ("Legal services, which accounted for only 0.6 percent
of gross domestic product in 1960, accounted for 1.39 percent in 1987.").
170. See Aric Press, The Century Thus Far, AM. LAW., May 2006, at 123, 125 ("Since
2000, the average PPP [profits per partner] has increased 44 percent, to $1.06 million");
Aric Press & John O'Connor, Lessons of the Am Law 100, AM. LAW., May 2007, at 127
(noting change from previous year showed, "Gross revenue up 11.4 percent, profits per
partner up 13.4 percent, revenue per lawyer up 7.3 percent"); Aric Press & John
O'Connor, Lessons of the Am. Law 100, AM. LAW., May 2008, at 131 (noting in 2007,
"[flor the first time, the [largest 100] firms showed five consecutive years of better-than-
average growth in both revenue per lawyer, the key measure of law firm financial suc-
cess, and profits per partner"). The decline and slow improvement of the market for
legal services since the Great Recession is found in Industry Data, U.S. DEP'T OF COM.
BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, https://bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=51&step=51&isuri
=1&5114-=a&5102=1#reqid=51&step=51&isuri=1&5114=a&5102=1 (last visited Feb-
ruary 28, 2018).
171. See Ariens, supra note 34, at 50-52.
172. THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: PRESENT THREATS/FuTURE CHAL-
LENGES (John B. Davidson ed., 1984) (reprinting talks).
173. See L. S. Carsey, Dealing with Change, 13 THE BRIEF, Nov. 1983, at 2 (noting
lawyer independence must be justified in light of the "public interest, not the private
interest of lawyers, individually or as a group"); L. S. Carsey, Acting Like Professionals,
13 THE BRIEF, Feb. 1984, at 2 (differentiating a business and a profession on the ground
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dence of the Lawyer in April 1984, and a second Presidential Show-
case program on professional independence at the 1984 ABA Annual
Meeting.17 4 This focus on professional independence was why Roger
Cramton was speaking at the annual TIPS luncheon in August 1984.
The professionalism movement was goosed by Chief Justice Warren
Burger's speech to the ABA decrying commercialism in the practice of
law at its February 1984 Midyear Meeting.
17 5
One of Burger's recommendations was that the ABA create a body
to "study the question of professionalism."176 As a result, a Special
Commission on Professionalism was created by ABA Board of Gover-
nors in December 1984. The Commission was charged in part with
responding to claims that "the Bar might be moving away from the
principles of professionalism and that it was so perceived by the pub-
lic.' 7 7 The Commission's report, published as "'In the Spirit of Public
Service:' A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism,"78
was widely reported. Among its conclusions were, "[t]he Bar should
place increasing emphasis on the role of lawyers as officers of the
court, or more broadly, as officers of the system of justice,"17 9 and that
lawyers not representing clients before legislatures "should support
legislation that is in the public interest."I8 0 Two of the seven "in gen-
eral" recommendations are relevant here. First, the bar was to "pre-
serve and develop . . . integrity, competence, fairness, independence,
courage and a devotion to the public interest."18 1 Second, lawyers
were to "[r]esist the temptation to make the acquisition of wealth a
primary goal of law practice."
182
It is not too strong to suggest that the publication of the Special
Commission's report ushered in a crusade by some influential lawyers
to re-establish professionalism within the profession. In 1988, TIPS
that only lawyers must serve "the general public interest"); L. S. Carsey, Basic Ques-
tions, 13 THE BRIEF, May 1984, at 2 (noting activity of TIPS Committee on the Profes-
sional Independence of the Lawyer); L. S. Carsey, Plenty to Worry About, 13 THE BRIEF,
Aug. 1984, at 2 ("The erosion of professionalism and independence is worth plenty of
worrying about . . . because the public good requires an independent profession of the
law, not a business of the law."). Carsey was a partner in the large Houston law firm of
Fulbright and Jaworski.
174. THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: AN IDEAL REVISITED (John B. Da-
vidson ed., 1985).
175. Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, A.B.A. J., at 62 (Apr. 1984).
176. ABA Comm'n on Professionalism, In the Spirit of Public Service: A Blueprint
for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986).
177. Report of the Commission on Professionalism, 111(2) A.B.A. ANN. REP. 369, 373
(1986).
178. See supra note 177.
179. Id. at 13.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 15.
182. Id.
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encouraged state and local bar associations to "adopt a lawyers' 'Creed
of Professionalism."'18 3 A professionalism creed was intended to cas-
tigate those lawyers willing to do whatever their clients wished. A
creed was to re-instill the idea that an "excessive zeal, a 'win at any
cost' mentality, 'scorched earth' tactics and the apotheosizing of 'play-
ing hard ball" 18 4 were impermissible abuses. The ABA was joined by
the American Bar Foundation1 8 5 and by courts and bar association in
sponsoring symposia and conferences on the subject.
186
During this same time, senior lawyers and law professors wrote
declaring a crisis in the legal profession. In the 1988 keynote address
at the celebration of the centennial of Cornell Law School, Sol Li-
nowitz claimed, "[wie have become a business dominated by "Bottom
Line" perspectives."18 7 The following year Peter Megargee Brown, an
early advocate of a return to professionalism, wrote Rascals: The Sell-
ing of the Legal Profession, the title of which he took from a letter to
him from Chief Justice Burger.1 8 8 Brown spoke of a transformation of
the profession in just twelve years. Though some lawyers had always
perceived the work of lawyers as a trade "and ignored professional
standards, the immense shift to the business ethos of growing giant
firms has been extraordinary-and harmful to society."18 9 Linowitz
returned to the subject of his Cornell keynote address with a book ti-
tled The Betrayed Profession.190 "Too many in my profession have
183. Rep. No. 2 of the Section of Tort and Insurance Practice, 113:2 ABA REP. 589,
589 (1988).
184. Id.
185. LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAwYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LE-
GAL PROFESSION, at ix (Robert L. Nelson et al., eds., 1992) (noting September 1988
program).
186. See The Texas Lawyer's Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism (promulgated
and adopted by the Supreme Court of Texas and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Nov. 7, 1989), reprinted in Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Pitting Aggressive
Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 657-62 (1990); Spec. Comm'n on
Professionalism, Illinois St. B. Ass'n, The Bar, the Bench and Professionalism in Illinois,
76 ILL. B.J. 441 (1988); Philip A Lacovara, Lawyers and Professionalism, WASH. LAW-
YER, Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 6 (noting "[t]hese days it is impossible to convene a meeting of
lawyers without discussing professionalism"); Nathan M. Crystal & Gregory B. Adams,
Introductory Remarks to the Conference on the Commercialization of the Legal Profes-
sion, 45 S.C. L. Rev. 883 (1994). My research assistant found 123 bar associations and
courts have promulgated professionalism creeds (copy on file with author).
187. Sol Linowitz, Keynote Address, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1256 (1988). See also
Arnold I. Burns, Disquieting and Disturbing Developments in Our Discipline, 18 COR-
NELL L. FORUM 9, 9 (1991) (noting many lawyers "hell-bent on acting like, being treated
like, and being perceived as tradesmen, rather than as members of a noble and time-
honored profession").
188. BROWN, supra note 162, at 9. Brown was an influential member of the first
TIPS Professionalism panel in 1983. See Ariens, supra note 35, at 50.
189. BROWN, -upra note 162, at 64.
190. SOL M. LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING
AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994).
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taken a calling that sought the good society and twisted it into an oc-
cupation that seems intent primarily on seeking a good income."
191
Harvard Law School Professor Mary Ann Glendon's A Nation Under
Lawyers19 2 detailed the relationship between the "crisis" in the profes-
sion and its impact on society. Yale Law School Professor (and soon
Dean) Anthony Kronman wrote The Lost Lawyer,193 which lamented
the loss of ideals among lawyers.
In the two decades after the collapse of the Kutak Commission's
efforts to instill greater lawyer fidelity to the public in the Model
Rules, three other items of note took place. The first item was a regu-
lar eruption of corporate frauds. These instances appeared to have in
common the failure of lawyers to grasp any understanding of duty
other than a very narrow duty of loyalty to the corporate client, or
more accurately, those corporate executives who spoke as the client's
representative. The savings and loan crisis of the mid-1980s led not
only to recriminations regarding lawyer behavior, but fines and settle-
ments totaling over $400 million.1 9 4 Close on the heels of S&L fail-
ures was the indictment in 1992 of the Bank of Commerce and Credit
International and two of its lawyers, Clark Clifford and Robert Alt-
man.19 5 In late 2001, Enron imploded. Enron's failure was quickly
followed by the resignations of the CEOs of WorldCom, Adelphia, and
Tyco (and later bankruptcies and criminal or civil charges), and the
conviction of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm for its actions con-
cerning Enron.196 This third round of corporate frauds suggested to
one former large law firm partner, "[tihe problem is that corporate and
legal culture has lost all sense of right and wrong."
197
The second item of note was the apparent increase in unhappi-
ness and depression among lawyers. Several Sections of the ABA
191. LINOWITZ, supra note 190, at 22.
192. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994).
193. ANTONY T. KEONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION (1993).
194. Steve France, Unhappy Pioneers: S&L Lawyers Discover a "New World" of Lia-
bility, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 725, 726 (1994) (noting further that "[a]t least twenty-two
of the largest 200 law firms in the country ... have been sued for malpractice by the
federal banking agencies in connection with services provided to failed banks and
thrifts). See also Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on
Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 Bus. LAW. 143, 143 n.3 (2002) (noting administrative fines
levied on law firms of $24 and $41 million for actions in representing Lincoln Savings
and Loan); Harris Weinstein, Attorney Liability in the Savings and Loan Crisis, 1993 U.
ILL. L. REV. 53 (noting "over 1000 criminal cases and nearly 2000 civil suits arising from
the savings and loan crisis," including "more than ninety civil cases brought against
lawyers").
195. See Ariens, supra note 116, at 266-67.
196. See id. at 295-300 (offering timeline).
197. William H. Widen, Enron at the Margins, 58 Bus. LAW. 961, 962-63 (2003).
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sponsored a conference in 1991 on The Emerging Crisis in the Quality
of Lawyers' Health and Lives-Its Impact on Law Firms and Client
Services.198 The ABA Young Lawyers Division had sponsored a sur-
vey of lawyers in 1984 regarding dissatisfaction in the practice of law.
That survey was repeated in 1990. Both suggested an "emerging cri-
sis [that] already affects private practitioners in significant num-
bers."199 The 1990 survey indicated an increasing dissatisfaction in
the practice of law. For example, the percentage of lawyers who were
very satisfied with their work dropped by 20% (from 41% to 33%).
200
Without explaining why, the 1991 Breaking Point Conference con-
cluded that the problem was not due to the "conflict between the prac-
tice of law as a business rather than as a profession," but to the
adoption of "management principles that are not only antithetical to
the conduct of the practice of law as a profession, but also unsound
under modern business management theory."20 1 In 1999, Patrick
Schiltz offered a depressing assessment of the emotional health of
lawyers. Lawyers "seem to be among the most depressed people in
America."202 Lawyers also "appear to be prodigious drinkers,"20 3 and
possess rates of "anxiety, hostility, and paranoia" higher than
society.
204
One additional conclusion of the Breaking Point conference was
the problem arising "when the common good as the driving factor is
replaced by the desire for wealth, when money is not just incidental to
the practice, but at its core."20 5 Despite this warning, the desire for
wealth did not diminish during the 1990s. Schiltz noted at the end of
the decade that the legal profession "is absolutely obsessed with
money."20 6 It was certainly the case that the legal services pie contin-
198. AM. BAR ASS'N, THE REPORT OF AT THE BREAKING POINT: A NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE ON THE EMERGING CRISIS IN THE QUALITY OF LAWYERS' HEALTH AND LrvEs-ITs
IMPACT ON LAW FIRMS AND CLIENT SERVICES (1991).
199. Id. at 29.
200. Id. at 9.
201. Id. at 12.
202. Schiltz, supra note 17, at 874. See also NANCY LEVIT & DOUGLAS 0. LINDER,
THE HAPPY LAWYER: MAKING A GOOD LIFE IN THE LAW 6 (2010) (noting "exceptionally
high rates of depression, alcoholism, and suicide" among lawyers).
203. Schiltz, supra note 17, at 876.
204. See id. at 876. But see Jerome M. Organ, What do We Know about the Satisfac-
tion IDissatisfaction of Lawyers-A Meta-Analysis of Research on Lawyer Satisfaction
and Well-Being, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L. REv. 225, 237 table 1 (2011) (listing surveys show-
ing much greater lawyer satisfaction regarding their work from late 1980s through
1990s than indicated by Schiltz). See also LEVIT & LINDER, supra note 202, at 7 (stating
"we are inclined to conclude that most lawyers fall somewhere near the middle of the
happiness continuum").
205. See supra note 198, at 12.
206. Schiltz, supra note 17, at 903.
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ued to expand from the end of the 1991 recession past the recession of
2001. That quickly ended with the Great Recession.
The third item of interest struck close to the perceived exceptional
nature of the work of lawyers. When the traditional Milbank Tweed
firm decided to re-invent itself in the late 1980s, it surveyed prospec-
tive corporate clients about what they wanted in their lawyers. To the
firm's surprise, survey respondents "were not looking for 'quality and
integrity' when choosing their counselors."20 7 Even more surprising,
"[s]uperior work product could no longer be used as an effective selling
point."2 oN
The Young Division Lawyers of the ABA surveyed its members
about job satisfaction on several occasions. In its 2000 version, 69.1%
of the 800 respondents found the expectations and experiences regard-
ing the intellectual challenge of the job satisfaction converged "very
well," with another 28.4% finding "somewhat" of a convergence.
20 9
Overall, 97.3% agreed that their work was challenging.
210
The intellectual challenge of law work required craftsmanship.
Craftsmanship meant the exercise of skill in the absence of standardi-
zation. That skill demonstrated technical expertise, but also might
demonstrate a detachment from the client. That detachment might be
used to serve the higher values of the legal system (as perhaps, when
representing the outcast) or might show an absence of values in the
practice of law.
2 11
The appeal to craftsmanship had been made in the early 1950s in
defense of a strongly client-centered ethic of advocacy: "A lawyer may
have to treat the practice of law as if it were a game, but if he can rely
on craftsmanship, it may become an art, and 'Art, being bartender, is
never drunk; and Magic that believes itself, must die.'"2 12 Boston
lawyer Charles P. Curtis suggested lawyers adopt he ethic of crafts-
manship as an art, as an aesthetic approach to the practice of law.
This approach would diminish the lawyer's duty to the public, and re-
duce the concerns of conscience in the practice of law. This solution
207. ELLEN JOAN POLLOCK, TURKS AND BRAHINms: UPHEAVAL AT MILBANK, TWEED:
WALL STREET'S GENTLEMEN TAKE OFF THEIR GLOVES 264 (1990).
208. Id. at 264 (noting view of leading partner that it was "a revolutionary
conclusion").
209. ABA YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION SURVEY: CAREER SATISFACTION 20 (2000), http'/
liblog.law.stanford.edu/wp-contentuploads/2012/10/ABA-YLD-2000-Career-Satisfac
tion-Survey.pdf. The numbers for the 1995 survey were 67.9% and 30.2%, respectively.
See id.
210. Id. at 22. The level of agreement was 57.2% "very," and 40.1% "somewhat." Id.
211. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Life of the Law: Value, Commitment, and
Craftsmanship, 100 HARv. L. REV. 795, 816 (1987) (distinguishing the "technical expert,
detached and indifferent" from the lawyer who "will care enough to make a difference").
212. Charles P. Curtis, Jr., The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 22 (1951)
(quoting PETER VIERECK, TERROR AND DECORUM 53 (1948)).
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might fit the profession as long as lawyers convinced themselves they
were doing their jobs well.
The problem confronted by Milbank Tweed is one more lawyers
currently face, as Curtis's solution to the dilemma of two masters has
faded in the past several decades. One reason for the rise of a legal
industry is that lawyers increasingly hawk standardized products,
even in sophisticated legal fields. Products in an industrial setting are
sufficiently standardized, so that the art of the craftsman is neither
needed nor wanted. The Great Recession suggested the same might
be true for lawyers.
213
One result of these disparate events was that prospects for law-
yers were both enthralling and chilling. The salaries for new lawyers
continued to rise from 2000 to 2007, as did the profits per partner in
the largest law firms. One concern was that this growth was unsus-
tainable. Once it ended, what would happen?
In addition to its professionalism work, the ABA made several ef-
forts to stem the perceived threat of commercialism. One example
was from the ABA Section of Litigation. It created a task force in the
mid-1990s to examine why "far too many examples of lawyer lapses
were being reported."2 14 Whether such lawyers engaged in such ethi-
cal lapses because they were willing to do anything for the fee their
clients were paying was unclear. What was clear from the task force
was that protestations of lawyer professionalism were often rejected
by corporate clients, including in-house counsel. One client represen-
tative chastised lawyers for "hanging on to an outmode ethos of profes-
sionalism instead of embracing a business ethos."2 15 This view
correctly understood the rhetoric of professionalism: it constrained the
adoption by lawyers of the ethos of the market. Business clients dis-
liked that constraint.
A second effort was by an ABA Committee on Research About the
Future of the Legal Profession. It printed its Working Notes on the
Current Status of the Legal Profession on August 31, 2001.216 The
Committee began by declaring the immensity of the stakes: "We are in
the midst of the biggest transformation of civilization since the
caveman began bartering."2 17 That transformation included both the
legal system and its lawyers. Any such transformation, however, ne-
213. See MITCHELL KOWALSKi, THE GREAT LEGAL REFORMATION, 111-12 (2017) (not-
ing "quality legal expertise is fast becoming nothing more than table stakes").
214. Lawrence J. Fox, Nancy McCready Higgins & Donald B. Hilliker, Report: Eth-
ics: Beyond the Rules: Historical Preface, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 691, 691 (1998).
215. Austin Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism: A Study of Judges' and Lawyers'
Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 829 (1998).
216. See supra note 9.
217. Id. at 2.
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cessitated an independent bar to "recreate ourselves with a culture
and a regulatory structure that preserves our core principles, protects
our clients, and maintains our relevance."2 1 s
The Committee left unstated what the core principles of the pro-
fession were. It did note, "[o]ur greatest peril is that if we cannot sur-
vive as an 'industry' and as a profession, then the underlying core
principles and the Rule of Law are themselves at risk."2 1 9 It also
noted, "the law is not just another business or industry."2 20 Law was
the basis for our system of self-governance, and that system needed
lawyers to ensure justice was served.
Section III of the Working Notes discussed "The Changing Face of
Private Law Practice."2 2 1 It reads as working notes, a section cobbled
together from different committee members given different tasks. It
discusses both the likely impact of technological change on small firms
and the rapid growth in large firm revenues. It did not offer any
thoughts on transformative changes to the practice that either such
lawyer engaged in. The section also failed to offer any core principles
that needed to be preserved. Though the Committee noted its work
was continuing, no further report was ever made.
The most significant effort of the ABA at this time was Ethics
2000, the creation of a commission to re-assess the 1983 Model
Rules.22 2 The Ethics 2000 Commission was formed in 1997. It was
charged by the ABA Board of Governors with undertaking a "compre-
hensive review and some revision" of the Model Rules.2 23 The com-
mission completed its work in time for discussion and vote in the ABA
House of Delegates at the annual meeting in August 2001.
The most important amendment proposed by Ethics 2000 regard-
ing serving both the client and the public was adding several excep-
tions to Rule 1.6. The Commission suggested some limits on the
lawyer's duty not to disclose confidential information from and regard-
ing a client. The ABA House of Delegates had been down this road
before in 1982 when it had markedly trimmed the proposed exceptions
to client confidences during its lengthy discussion of the Model
Rules.2 24 At its August 2001 annual meeting, the ABA House of Dele-
gates refused to include the following exceptions to the rule on client
218. Id.
219. Id. at 4.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 36.
222. See Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441 (2002) (re-
counting origins and work of commission).
223. Id. at 441 n.1 (quoting E. Norman Veasey, chair of the Ethics 2000
Commission).
224. See Ariens, supra note 27, at 739-41.
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confidences: (1) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud
in which the lawyer's services had or were being used; or (2) to allow a
lawyer to disclose a client confidence to rectify a past fraud in which
the client used the lawyer's services.225 The result of this action was
that lawyers were prohibited from disclosing a client confidence re-
lated to a past or future fraud under the Model Rules.
Then Enron collapsed. A task force on corporate responsibility
was created by the ABA, and it preliminarily suggested that lawyers
owed a duty to others to report past or future frauds, including disclos-
ing confidences made by clients.22 6 That is, not only was the lawyer
no longer prohibited from disclosing such confidences, the task force's
preliminary proposal required lawyers to do so.
With this proposal, the ABA hoped to avoid regulation of lawyers
by the SEC. When SEC regulations arrived with an impact less sig-
nificant than feared by corporate lawyers, the task force on corporate
responsibility altered its course. In its final report, issued in March
2003, the task force suggested amending the rules on client confi-
dences to permit, but not require, lawyers to disclose confidences to
rectify past frauds and to prevent future frauds.2 27
Though the increasing demands made by clients, particularly cor-
porate clients, were known by ABA leaders and officers, and though
ABA leaders knew of the problems generated by such demands, the
ABA followed its traditional path. The ABA spoke of the duty of law-
yers faithfully to protect their clients and the public, to act as profes-
sionals and not mere merchants. It then wrote rules that tipped the
balance in favor of clients.
Alexander Forger, the managing partner of the New York firm of
Milbank Tweed during the late 1980s, may have expressed best the
end of the lawyer as social trustee acting for the public as well as cli-
ents.2 28 As the firm reacted to the shifts in business of law in the late
1980s, Forger declared to his partners, "[w]e are not a trade or busi-
ness. We are a profession." But Forger himself called this declaration
"a hysterical note from the past."2 29
225. See House of Delegates Proceedings, 126:2 ABA REP. 1, 37 (2001).
226. Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility, 58 Bus. LAW. 189, 206 (2002).
227. Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility,
59 Bus. LAw. 145, 174 (2003). The SEC's proposed rules used the permissive "may,"
which the task force then adopted. Id.; see Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, 67 FED. REG. 71760, 71762 (Dec. 2, 2002).
228. See Ariens, supra note 34, at 52 (describing end of social trustee professional-
ism). See generally STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF PRO-
FESSIONALS IN POLITICS AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1994) (tracing broader history of social
trustee professionalism).
229. ELLEN S. POLLOCK, supra note 207, at 266.
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Lawyers during the past three decades have faced both crises and
opportunities. The crises were, as is often the case, brief spells in
which the authority of lawyers to exercise power was challenged. But
these challenges never became threats. The monopoly granted to
those licensed to practice law remains largely unquestioned.
Opportunities, particularly economic opportunities, were found in
longer stretches of time. Lawyers succeeded in generating work in
good times and bad times, and whether political leaders pursued
smaller or larger government. One institutional opportunity foregone
was an examination of the public purposes of lawyers' work. The task
was not to resolve an age-old dilemma; it was simply to reconsider the
manner in which lawyers were to be bound. A client-centered ap-
proach to the practice of law may surely be justified, but doing so re-
quires lawyers to agree to let others sell in the same market. If
lawyers are better described as part of a legal industry, the monopoly
granted lawyers harms industry consumers.
V. CONCLUSION
In the midst of rigorously re-orienting large law firm partners on
the need to re-structure their firms after changes wrought the legal
industry by the Great Recession, consultant and author Bruce Mac-
Ewen quotes the late Simon Rifkind,230 one of the named partners in
the New York law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison.
In particular, MacEwen quotes in part Rifkind's 1963 Statement of
Firm Principles. Rifkind declared the firm's goal was:
[T]o achieve the highest order of excellence in the practice of
the art, the science and the profession of the law; through
such practice to earn a living and to derive the stimulation
and pleasure of worthwhile adventure; and in all things to
govern ourselves as members of a free democratic society
with responsibilities both to our profession and our
country.
231
MacEwen quotes Rifkind's statement in a chapter declaring that
large law firm success in the post-Great Recession era requires firm
leaders to change their mindset.23 2 The second mindset change sug-
gested by MacEwen is, "[tireat your business like a business."2 33
Rifkind's statement of firm principles is specifically not about law as a
230. See Leslie Gordon Fagen, Ri/kind, Simon H., in THE YALE BIOGRAPHIcAL Dic-
TIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 459 (Roger K Newman ed., 2009).
231. MACEWEN, at 62; see also Statement of Firm Principles, PAUL WEIss, https://
www.paulweiss.com/about-the-firm/principles (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
232. MACEWEN, supra note 25, 55-64.
233. Id. at 57. In another section MacEwen counsels, "[ilt better not be all about the
money." Id. at 18.
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business. Of course one objective in the practice of law is to earn a
living. That has always been a central aspect of the practice of law in
the United States. It is also the reason for the public's fear that law-
yers will do anything to serve their client's interests. Rifkind's decla-
ration is that earning a living is best accomplished through excellence
in the "art, the science and the profession of the law." And a lawyer
achieved excellence while acknowledging responsibilities not only to
the client, but "both to our profession and our country."
MacEwen did not quote all of Rifkind's statement of firm princi-
ples. Some of Rifkind's unquoted assertions do not fit comfortably
with the ethos of the legal industry. One example is Rifkind's conclu-
sion: "Finally, we are committed to achieving our objectives without
wearing any client's collar or any political party's livery.
'234
Rifkind's firm principles are reminders that the joint ideals of in-
dependence from and fidelity to both client and society were embedded
in the notion of a profession of law. These ideals were never to be
grasped, much less captured. Lawyers were, however, to pursue them
while knowing the chase was bound to fail. The effort to abide by an
oath to serve with "all good fidelity" the clients and the court or public
reminded the lawyer of the duty to serve others rather than self. It
also reminded the lawyer that no one can serve two demanding and
conflicting masters.
The legal industry offers its customers extraordinary technical
skills, but it shies from offering those customers anything else. In
part, the legal industry may so act because its customers want only
those skills. It may also do so because the ideals of professionalism
barely exist. A significant part of the legal industry is simply a busi-
ness, and it seems time to acknowledge this is so. Before the ideals
that distinguished law from a business are extinct, lawyers may wish
to reacquaint themselves with Karl Llewellyn's warning over eighty
years ago: "Ideals without technique are a mess. But technique with-
out ideals is a menace."23 5
234. See Statement of Firm Principles, PAUL WEISS, https://www.paulweiss.coml
about-the-firm/principles (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
235. Karl N. Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 651, 662 (1935).
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